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Abstract
After World War II, about 8 million ethnic Germans — so called expellees — were forced
to leave their homelands and settle within the new borders of West Germany. Subsequently, a
law (Federal Expellee Law) was introduced to foster their labor market integration. We evaluate
this law by comparing the employment situation between expellees and groups of West Germans
and GDR refugees over time. We define our comparison groups to uncover even small effects of
the law. Still, we find no evidence that the law met its goal to foster the expellees’ labor market
integration.
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I. Introduction 
We study the effect of an integration policy in the context of a forced mass 
migration that occurred in the aftermath of WWII. Significant territorial changes 
forced 8 million of ethnic Germans, hereafter expellees, to leave their homelands in 
East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and Bohemia and settle within the new borders of 
West Germany (cf. Schmidt 1994). This was possibly one of the largest mass 
migration shocks ever experienced by a developed country in modern history. After 
their displacement, many expellees experienced a huge loss in status. While many 
of them owned real estate or were self-employed before World War II, large 
fractions of expellees became occupied in low skilled jobs or even unemployed.  
After the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949, the Federal 
Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) was introduced in 1953 as a reaction to 
the expellees’ overall bad economic situation. The law aimed at improving the 
economic situation of the expellees. For this purpose, the law instructed public 
employment services to consider expellees first as long as local unemployment 
rates among expellees were higher than among local West Germans. Public 
employment services were further instructed to assist expellees in finding a job 
equivalent to their occupation prior to WWII and to promote self-employment and 
entrepreneurship in agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. Incentives for self-
employment and entrepreneurship included credits at subsidized interest rates or 
tax credits. Moreover, short-run credits were converted into long-run credits at 
subsidized interest rates to support expellees who were already entrepreneurs or 
self-employed. Taken together, this leaves us with the following three aspects 
targeted by the Federal Expellee Law: (i) Transition from unemployment to 
employment; (ii) restitution of previous or comparable occupations in case of 
degradation, (iii) promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment. 
To evaluate whether the Federal Expellee Law met these goals, we exploit 
data from the 1971 micro census that allow us to identify and distinguish expellees 
from local West Germans.1 Furthermore, the 1971 census contains a special survey 
that provides retrospective information about the respondents’ occupation in 1939, 
1950, 1960 and 1971. Put differently, we have retrospective information about the 
occupational status of individuals at one point before WWII, one point after WWII 
but before the introduction of the law, and two points after the introduction of the 
law. Based on this information, we create a longitudinal dataset for the period 1939 
to 1971. Depending on the outcome targeted by the law, we define different 
comparison groups drawn from the population of local West Germans and, in the 
case of entrepreneurship and self-employment, from the population of refugees 
                                                          
1
 For a description of these data in the context of expellees, see Luettinger (1989). 
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from the GDR.2 These refugees constitute an interesting comparison group because, 
similarly to the expellees, they lost their property and social contacts due to their 
flight. However, apart from a small group of political refugees, GDR refugees did 
not benefit from the law.  
Our empirical analyses compare the observed occupational status of 
expellees and local West Germans in the years 1960 and 1971 conditional on 
socio-demographic characteristics. To disentangle the integration effect of the 
Federal Expellee law from a more general catch-up process of expellees in times 
of dramatic economic growth where unemployment among local West Germans 
was close to zero, we match expellees and local West Germans based on their 
economic situation in 1950.3 This approach should uncover even small effects of 
the law since local West Germans found themselves in a better economic situation 
in 1950 than expellees with similar socio-demographic characteristics. One 
indication is for instance that most West Germans worked in an occupation 
similar to the one before WWII in 1950. Those West Germans who faced – 
similar to the expellees – a worse economic situation in 1950 than before WWII 
were apparently a selective group although they resemble the expellees in their 
characteristics. A comparison between this group of local West Germans and the 
expellees may thus favour a positive effect of the law. Despite the possibility of 
an upward bias in our estimations, we find no evidence that the law met its 
defined goal to foster expellees’ labor market integration.  
Our research contributes to other recent papers that employ micro-level 
data to analyze the assimilation of individuals who were expelled from their 
homelands following territorial changes in the aftermath of WWII (cf. Braun et al. 
2011 for Germany or Sarvimäki et al. 2011 for Finland). Specifically, we are 
interested in the success of an integration policy in Germany and attempt to 
disentangle general assimilation effects. One may question the external validity of 
our results arguing that this historical episode is a period of dramatic growth 
leaving the Federal Expellee Law with no comparable successors. By contrast, we 
argue that parts of the law indeed have their contemporaneous counterparts. Many 
active labor market policies today put emphasis on public employment services to 
assist unemployed workers in finding jobs and entrepreneurship policies try to 
alleviate financing constraints of potential entrepreneurs by granting credits at 
reduced interest rates and tax credits. In the meantime, evaluation studies have 
provided a lot of evidence on the effectiveness of public employment services (for 
an overview, cf. Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999). However, our knowledge 
about the success of entrepreneurship policies is still limited. Our paper is thus not 
                                                          
2
 Before 1949, the GDR was the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. For simplicity, we will 
refer to it as GDR throughout the paper. 
3
 There is a huge literature on the assimilation of immigrants. For an overview, see, for example, 
Borjas (1994 and 1999) and Pekkala Kerr and Kerr (2011).  
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only a piece in economic history but also contributes to other literature strands, 
among others on the effects of entrepreneurship polices. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
historical background. Section 3 introduces our data and provides descriptive 
statistics on the socio-demographic characteristics of expellees and their 
development in the labor market. In Section 4, we present estimation results on 
the impacts of the Federal Expellee Law on various labor market outcomes 
targeted by the law. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Historic Context 
The significant territorial changes that occurred in the aftermath of WWII resulted 
in large migration streams across Europe. The biggest of these involved almost 8 
million ethnic Germans who were forced by the Red Army and, after WWII, the 
Potsdam Treaty to leave their homelands, predominantly East Prussia, Pomerania, 
Silesia, East Brandenburg, and the Sudetenland, and settle within the new borders 
of West Germany. This forced mass migration affected all ethnic German 
individuals regardless of their social status or skill level (Bethlehem 1982; Schmidt 
1994). Table 1 illustrates the distribution of expellees across West German states in 
absolute numbers, as a fraction of the expellee population, and as a fraction of the 
local West German population. 
The mechanism for allocating expellees across settlement states worked as 
follows. In the period between the end of WWII in 1945 and the founding of the 
two separate German states in 1949, the allied powers divided Germany into four 
occupation zones. Figure 1 shows the four occupation zones along with the 
predominantly ethnic German areas where the expellees lived before WWII. In 
1949, the French, British, and U.S. zones of occupation were merged into the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Soviet zone became the socialist 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). Table 1 reveals that there was an especially 
pronounced difference in the number of expellees in the French occupation zone 
compared to the other zones. This is due to the French authorities’ desire to limit 
the number of people competing for already scarce resources (Grosser 2001). As a 
result, initially Rhineland-Palatine and the French-occupied areas in Baden-
Württemberg received no expellees.4 Authorities in the other zones distributed the 
expellees according to a central formula based on the availability of nutrition and 
housing space. Since most German cities were destroyed and nutrition and housing 
were more plentiful in rural areas, the vast majority of expellees were settled in the 
countryside (cf. Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm  2004; Grosser 2006). 
                                                          
4
 Only after 1948 did authorities reallocate expellees from regions with a high number to regions 
with fewer, particularly to the French regions. Thus, by 1956, about 1 million expellees had been 
forced to relocate again. 
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Figure 1: Zones of occupation and predominantly ethnic German areas 
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Furthermore, free movement within the territory of the German Federal Republic 
was restricted by Allied legislation until June 1950.5 The economic situation of 
most expellees was precarious. Some of them were able to meet at least a part of 
their needs by working as unskilled labor in the agricultural sector, but many 
suffered hunger and had to beg or steal to fulfill their basic needs (Vaskovics 
2002). In many regions, expellees were viewed as a burden and this was reflected 
in governmental restrictions on their rental contracts (Schaut 1995). Often, 
expellees were refused the permits necessary for starting a business. Attaining 
recognition of formal occupational qualifications, e.g., certificates for lawyers or 
doctors, was complicated (Müller 1993; Schaut 1995). There were barriers to 
accessing capital because banks did usually not provide credit to expellees 
without any collateral. As a result, in 1950, only a small fraction of expellees 
worked in the same field or occupation as they had in 1939 (Schaut 1995). 
In 1953, the German government introduced the Federal Expellee Law 
(Bundesvertriebenengesetz) with the goal of restoring the expellees’ status quo 
and improving their situation.6 The law provided official acceptance and 
legitimation for a wide range of occupational certificates held by expellees, 
including those of doctors, dentists, and craftsmen (§§ 69–71). The law instructed 
public employment services to first place expellees as long as local 
unemployment rates among expellees were higher than among local West 
Germans. Public employment services were further instructed to assist expellees 
in finding a job equivalent to their occupation prior to WWII (§§ 77-79). The law 
improved access to start-up capital and provided tax incentives for self-
employment and entrepreneurship. Converting short-run credits to entrepreneurs 
and self-employed individuals into long-run credits at a subsidized interest rate 
was further designed to reduce exits among expellees who were already 
entrepreneurs or self-employed (§§ 72 and 73). The law offered better 
opportunities to rent state-owned property for business purposes (§ 76), and 
ensured that businesses run by expellees were treated preferentially when public 
contracts were awarded (§§ 74 and 75). Finally, the law also helped integrate 
those who had been farmers prior to WWII into the agriculture sector (§§ 35–68).  
                                                          
5
 Unfortunately, the micro census does not provide information on the migration process of 
expellees after they were allocated across West Germany. However, on the basis of regional-level 
data from the population censuses in 1950 and 1961, we calculated the correlation coefficient of 
the share of expellees in 1950 and 1961 across regions. It is about 0.82 and highly significant. We 
conclude by this that the mobility of expellees after 1950 was rather limited. 
6
 From 1949-1969, the Federal Republic of Germany formed the “Federal Ministry for Displaced 
Persons, Refugees and War Victims” that was part of the West German government. It was 
responsible to coordinate the integration of displaced persons and refugees, care for war victims 
and provide compensation and initial aid. This ministry also enacted the Federal Expellee Law in 
1953. 
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Table 1: Expellees by state in post-war Germany in 1950  
State Occupation Zone   Number of Expellees   % of Expellees   % of State Population 
Bavaria A  1,937,000  16.2  21 
Lower Saxony B  1,851,000  15.5  27 
North Rhine-Westphalia B  1,332,000  11.2  10 
Baden-Württemberg F/A  862,000  7.2  13.5 
Schleswig-Holstein B  857,000  7.2  33 
Hessen A  721,000  6  16.5 
Rhineland-Palatinate F  152,000  1.3  5 
West-Berlin A/F/B  148,000  1.2  7 
Hamburg B  116,000  1  7 
Bremen A   48,000   0.4   9 
West Germany A, B and F  8,024,000  67.2  15.75 
Notes: A = American, B = British, F = French, S = Soviet. Source: Federal Statistical Office. 
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The eligibility requirements to benefit from these privileges were tied to the official 
status as an expellee (Categories A and B). This status was defined in Section 1 of 
the 1953 Federal Expellee Law, and defines an expellee as being either a German 
citizen or an ethnic German who before and/or during WWII lived within the 1917–
1937 borders of eastern Germany and Austria-Hungary.7 In addition to expellees, 
political refugees from the socialist GDR (and, prior to 1949, the Soviet zone) were 
also covered by this law (§ 3). However, to qualify as “eligible refugees” (Category 
C), GDR refugees had to prove that they had suffered “a direct threat to life and 
limb or their personal freedom” (Ackermann 1995, p. 13). 
In the empirical section of this paper, we focus on expellees in Categories A 
and B only, omitting from our analysis those GDR refugees (Category C) who were 
covered by the Federal Expellee Law. Given their political motives for leaving East 
Germany, GDR refugees are probably a highly distinctive group and including 
them in our empirical analyses could bias our estimates of the effect of the Federal 
Expellee Law. However, in some specifications, we will use GDR refugees who are 
not covered by the law as a comparison group. The GDR refugees who were not 
covered by the Category C of the Federal Expellee Law were looking for political 
freedom and economic prosperity (cf. Ackerman 1995; Heidemeyer 1994; 
Hoffmann 2000).8 Altogether, more than 2.75 million people fled East Germany to 
resettle in West Germany prior to construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and, like 
the expellees, the refugees from the GDR were at first centrally distributed across 
the federal states according to §17(1) of the 1950 provisional accommodation law 
(Notaufnahmegesetz). The provisional accommodation law granted some financial 
support to the GDR refugees, but it was far less extensive than that available under 
the Federal Expellee Law.  
 
3. Expellees’ Socio-Demographic Characteristics and their Development in 
the Labor Market, 1939-1971 
Our data are drawn from the German micro census 1971. The micro census consists 
of a 1 percent sample of the German population and provides representative cross-
                                                          
7
 Since we employ a twofold definition of expellees based on their residence in 1939 and the 
possession of an expellee pass, we count expellees who migrated to the GDR first and then to 
West Germany as expellees and not as GDR refugees. 
8
 As it became clear that Germany’s separation was permanent and that East Germany was 
adopting a Soviet system a first wave of GDR refugees included a large number of civil servants. 
In our sample, about 7 percent of GDR refugees worked in the civil service before WWII 
compared to 4 to 5 percent of West Germans and expellees. This is because the Soviet authorities 
abolished the civil service system and because the denazification was more rigorous in the GDR 
leaving more people who were public employees during the Nazi era without a job. Only later 
when it became apparent that collectivization of agriculture was imminent, did individuals 
working in this sector leave East Germany. 
7
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sectional statistics for the population and labor market in Germany.9 The micro 
census 1971 includes an extension (MZU 1971) that was designed to gain insight 
into expellees’ integration into the German labor market and society. This extension 
is particularly interesting for our analysis because it contains detailed retrospective 
information on the occupation of the German population in 1939, 1950, and 1960 
as well as the place of residence in 1939, home ownership in 1939, and the year of 
arrival within the new borders of West Germany.10 Our analyses concentrate on 
individuals who have finished education and transited into the labor market by 
1939. All socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents stem from the year 
1971. Since our sample is restricted to individuals who have finished education 
before 1939, the variable highest educational degree obtained is time invariant. 
Other characteristics like age at arrival are counted back from the 1971 information. 
We end up with retrospective longitudinal data ranging from 1939 to 1971. This 
leaves us with individual information from one point in time before displacement 
(1939), one point in time after displacement but before the Federal Expellee Law 
set in (1950) and two points in time after the law was introduced (1960 and 1971).  
Our definition of expellee status is twofold. We define a person as an 
expellee if he or she (i) possesses a Category A or B pass and (ii) lived in the 
former eastern territories of the German Reich or Austria-Hungary in 1939. We 
only consider expellees who arrived within the new borders of Germany between 
1945 and 1950 because they were forced to migrate immediately after WWII. We 
drop individuals who came during the Nazi regime or who voluntarily arrived after 
1950 in search of economic opportunities. After excluding individuals with missing 
data on occupational status, our sample contains 23,183 expellees. The sample 
further includes 146,786 local West Germans and 2,826 GDR refugees who 
migrated to West Germany between 1945 and 1950, 1,896 of whom were not 
accepted as political refugees and not covered by the Federal Expellee Law. Our 
final sample consists of about 13.5 percent expellees and 1.6 percent refugees from 
the Soviet zone of occupation. Given an overall population of roughly 50 million in 
West Germany in 1950, this sample is a good representation of the population 
shares, i.e., the group of expellees (8 million) being about 15 percent of the West 
German population and the refugees from East Germany (2.75 million until the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961; note that we look only at refugees who 
came to West Germany before 1951) being about 5 percent. 
                                                          
9 The micro census is a random sample combining a one-stage cluster sample design with a partial 
rotation procedure. In each sampling district, chosen from within the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, all households and persons are interviewed. Every year one-quarter of the 
sample households is replaced. 
10
 Retrospective data always bear the risk of misreported information. However, the German micro 
census does only ask major occupations which make it quite likely that respondents remember 
correctly. Further, misreporting should not be correlated with expellee status which is the variable 
of interest in our analysis.  
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Table 2: Socio-demographic characteristics of local West Germans and expellees  
 
West Germans 
 
Expellees 
 
Expellees – 
West Germans 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Female 0.6038 0.5907 -0.0131*** 
 (0.489)  (0.492)  (0.003) 
Age (1939)           31.6348 30.8424 -0.792*** 
                     (9.784)  (9.821)  (0.069) 
No Degree            0.0234 0.0302 0.0068*** 
                     (0.151)  (0.171)  (0.001) 
Elementary School    0.6425 0.6580 0.0155*** 
                     (0.479)  (0.474)  (0.003) 
Secondary School     0.2580 0.2391 -0.0189*** 
                     (0.438)  (0.427)  (0.003) 
High School          0.0126 0.0132 0.0006 
                     (0.112)  (0.114)  (0.001) 
Technical School     0.0482 0.0446 -0.0036*** 
                     (0.214)  (0.207)  (0.001) 
University           0.0138 0.0132 -0.0006 
                     (0.117)  (0.114)  (0.001) 
Real Estate (1939)   0.4847 0.5124 0.0278*** 
                     (0.500)  (0.500)  (0.004) 
Observations 146,786 
 
23,183 
  
Notes: This table provides sample means of the pre-war socio-demographic characteristics of 
local West Germans (Column 1) and expellees (Column 2) and the differences between the two 
groups (Column 3).  
 
Table 2 provides sample means of the pre-war socio-demographic characteristics 
of local West Germans (Column 1) and expellees (Column 2) and the differences 
between the two groups (Column 3).11 We find very small, although significant 
                                                          
11
 We will provide more information about the GDR refugees at a later point in the paper. 
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differences between local West Germans and expellees in terms of demographic 
characteristics like gender, age, and educational attainment.12 Virtually all local 
West Germans and expellees received at least basic schooling, about 6 percent in 
both groups completed advanced secondary education (high school or technical 
school), and more than 1 percent attended university. In 1939, a larger fraction of 
expellees owned property compared to local West Germans.  
Figure 2 shows the occupational status of local West Germans and 
expellees before and after WWII (for more details see Table A1 in the appendix). 
In 1939, the expellees’ occupational structure is very similar to that of local West 
Germans. The most important difference is that expellees were more likely to 
work as self-employed farmers before WWII compared to local West Germans. 
This might also explain the larger fraction of expellees who owned real estate and 
worked in a family business as compared to West Germans (see Table 2). We 
further observe that disproportionate numbers of expellees work in unskilled 
occupations after their displacement in 1950. In 1950 a smaller fraction of 
expellees reports to be self-employed or an entrepreneur (compared to local West 
Germans) and there are almost no self-employed farmers, presumably due to their 
loss of property. In accordance with the objectives documented in the Federal 
Expellee Law, we now focus on three distinct outcome categories. We construct 
dummy variables for each year indicating whether an individual (i) is unemployed 
or (ii) works in an unskilled occupation. Further, we consider if an individual is 
(iii) self-employed or an entrepreneur (i.e. owns a company with employees) 
where we distinguish between the agricultural and non-agricultural sector. We 
then separately estimate the following regression for all four years observed in our 
data to document the occupational development of the expellees compared to 
West Germans between 1939 and 1971. 
      	

   (1) 
 represents one of the four outcome variables on the occupational status of 
individual i in a given year (1939, 1950, 1960, or 1971). Exi is a dummy variable 
indicating expellee status and the matrix Xi includes socio-demographic control 
variables such as gender, age, education and property ownership in 1939. The 
coefficient of interest is β which measures the difference in the outcome variable 
of interest between expellees and local West Germans conditional on the 
observable socio-demographic characteristics. 
                                                          
12
 We will control for the variables in all following regressions.  
10
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Figure 2: Occupational status of local West Germans and expellees before and after WWII 
 
Notes: Graphs show the development (within 95 percent confidence bands) of four major occupations among 
expellees (black) and local West Germans (grey). 
11
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Since all outcome variables are binary, β can be interpreted as mean difference 
between expellees’ and local West Germans’ probability (in percentage points) of 
having a certain occupational status. Table 3 reports the coefficients from a linear 
probability model and marginal effects from a probit model on the expellee dummy 
for the four outcome variables in 1939 (before the displacement took place), in 
1950 (after the displacement occurred, but before the Federal Expellee Law was 
introduced), and in 1960 and 1971 (after the Federal Expellee Law was introduced). 
Both results from linear probability models and probit models are reported.13 In 
1939, there is no difference in the conditional probability to be unemployed 
between expellees and local West Germans (Columns 1 and 2). After their 
displacement, expellees are about 2 percentage points more likely to be 
unemployed compared to local West Germans (Columns 3 and 4). This difference 
decreases in 1960 (Columns 5 and 6) and 1971 (Columns 7 and 8). These figures 
clearly document that expellees had trouble to find jobs in West Germany right 
after their displacement. However, in 1960 and 1971 the difference in conditional 
probabilities of being unemployed between expellees and local West Germans 
decreased.  
Row 2 in Table 3 shows the difference in the conditional probability to 
work in an unskilled occupation between expellees and West Germans in 1939, 
1950, 1960 and 1971. In 1939, expellees are less likely to work in an occupation 
that does not require special training or education (Columns 1 and 2). Similar to the 
expellees’ increased conditional probability to be unemployed in 1950, expellees 
are about 8 percentage points more likely to be employed as an unskilled worker 
after their displacement than local West Germans (Columns 3 and 4). One reason 
might be that expellees’ school or job certificates were not accepted in West 
Germany or expellees were discriminated against by local firms or employers. Over 
time, the difference between expellees’ and local West Germans’ conditional 
probability to be employed as an unskilled worker decreased to 5.8 to 7.2 
percentage points in 1960 (Columns 5 and 6) and 2.7 to 4.5 percentage points in 
1971 (Columns 7 and 8).  
Regarding self-employment and entrepreneurship in the non-agricultural 
sector there are no significant differences between expellees and West Germans in 
1939. However, after their displacement, expellees are 3.3 and 3.4 percentage 
points less likely to be self-employed or entrepreneur in the non-agricultural sector 
than local West Germans (Columns 3 and 4). Again, this difference gets absolutely 
smaller over time. The pattern for self-employed farmers looks slightly different. In 
1939, expellees are 1.3 and 0.6 percentage points more likely to be self-employed 
in the agricultural sector (Columns 1 and 2). After their displacement, the 
coefficient turns negative and again gets absolutely smaller over time.  
                                                          
13
 For the probit models, we report marginal effects evaluated at the means of the covariates.  
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Table 3: Difference in the probability of having a certain occupational status between West Germans and expellees 
Occupation 1939  1950  1960  1971 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 LPM Probit  LPM Probit  LPM Probit  LPM Probit 
Unemployed -0.000 -0.000  0.026*** 0.012***  0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Unskilled worker -0.004 -0.006**  0.085*** 0.074***  0.072*** 0.058***  0.045*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Entrepreneur  
(non-agricultural) 0.002 0.001  -0.033*** -0.034***  -0.030*** -0.031***  -0.023*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Entrepreneur (agricultural) 0.013*** 0.006***  -0.043*** -0.033***  -0.038*** -0.025***  -0.022*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee dummy for the linear probability models and marginal effects evaluated at the means of the 
covariates for the probit models. All regressions control for female, age, education and property in 1939.  
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Overall, Table 3 shows a consistent pattern. Except for self-employed farmers 
(and unskilled workers in the probit model), there are no significant differences in 
the occupational structure between expellees and local West Germans in 1939. 
Columns (3) and (4) reveal that the displacement presented a severe intervention 
for expellees; in 1950 expellees were more likely to be unemployed, more likely 
to work in an unskilled occupation, and less likely to be self-employed in both the 
non-agricultural and the agricultural sector than local West Germans. Relative to 
their pre-war situation, expellees suffered a loss in economic status. Columns (5) 
to (8) suggest for all outcome variables that expellees caught up with local West 
Germans. However, this pattern might only capture a general catch-up process of 
immigrants in a period of dramatic economic growth where unemployment 
among the local West Germans was close to zero instead of an effect of the law. 
We try to disentangle these two effects— catch-up and law-induced integration—
by restricting our sample to expellees and local West Germans which are in the 
same occupational situation in 1950. We then infer the effects of the Federal 
Expellee Law by comparing their occupational status in 1960 and 1971.  
The idea underlying our strategy is the following. Given the overall better 
economic situation of local West Germans in 1950, we assume that those West 
Germans who are in an occupational situation similar to the expellees are a 
selective group. We condition on some observable characteristics but there are 
many other factors that might explain their below-average situation. We consider 
the aggregate of these factors as indication for a lower degree of integration which 
makes this subgroup of local West Germans more comparable to the expellees. 
Based on this argument, we use local West Germans in a similar occupational 
situation in 1950 as counterfactual group of individuals who are not integrated 
and not targeted by the law. Accordingly, a positive difference between these two 
groups should indicate a positive effect of the law. Given the selectivity of the 
subsample of local West Germans, we consider this approach as being pro-law as 
it should uncover even small effects.  
 
4. Effects of the Federal Expellee Law 
The economic development of expellees between 1939 and 1971 gives us an 
aggregate effect that captures the displacement effect, the effect of the law, and 
the general catch-up process of immigrants. The comparison of the coefficients in 
Columns (1) and (3) or Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 documents the 
displacement effect on expellees’ economic situation. To evaluate the effects of 
the law we look at the economic situation of expellees in 1960 and 1971, i.e. after 
the law was introduced. We try to disentangle the effects of the law from the 
catch-up effects by comparing expellees to specific subgroups of local West 
Germans. We then estimate the following regressions: 
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   (3) 
 
 represents one of the four outcome variables on the occupational status 
of individual i either in 1960 or 1971. Exi is a dummy variable indicating expellee 
status, Xi are control variables namely gender, age, education and property 
ownership in 1939 and   represents the error term that captures other 
unobservable effects. With respect to the objectives stated in the law, we 
condition expellees and local West Germans on their occupational situation 
, in 1950. When analyzing the restitution of previous or comparable 
occupations in case of degradation and the promotion of agricultural self-
employment and entrepreneurship, we also condition on the occupational situation 
in 1939. By comparing expellees and local West Germans in very similar 
situations after WWII, we reduce a potential bias that may arise from 
unobservable characteristics. 
 
4.1. Reduction of Unemployment among Expellees 
To evaluate the effect of public employment services on the integration of 
expellees, we first compare the unemployment status of expellees and local West 
Germans who were unemployed in 1950 at two points in time after the 
introduction of the law (1960; 1971). Given that less than 1 percent of the local 
West Germans were unemployed in 1950, the comparison group of unemployed 
West Germans in 1950 is obviously selective. If anything, we should thus find a 
positive effect of the law when comparing unemployed expellees in 1950 to the 
selective group of unemployed local West Germans. 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from equations (2) and (3). We 
report the coefficients of linear probability models and marginal effects of probit 
models. The variable of interest is expellee status. If the law was successful in 
prioritizing unemployed expellees over unemployed local West Germans, we 
should find a negative and significant coefficient. However, the coefficient is 
close to zero and statistically not significant in both models. That is, compared to 
local West Germans expellees were not less likely to be unemployed in 1960 and 
1971, given that both groups reported being unemployed in 1950. By taking into 
account the very low unemployment rates in both groups in 1960 and 1971, the 
reduction in unemployment among the expellees is likely driven by the overall 
growth of the economy and not by the Federal Expellee Law. 
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Table 4: Unemployment 
  
1960     1971 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
Expellee -0.002  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Age  0.001*  0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female 0.044***  0.031***  -0.002  -0.001 
 
(0.011)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Elementary School 0.008  0.009  0.005**  0.035*** 
 
(0.023)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
Secondary School 0.014  0.015  0.007*  0.015*** 
 
(0.023)  (0.019)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
High School -0.015    -0.000   
 
(0.022)    (0.001)   
Technical School -0.004  0.010  -0.000   
 
(0.024)  (0.026)  (0.001)   
University -0.016    0.002   
 
(0.023)    (0.002) 
  
Property (1939) -0.008  -0.008  -0.003  -0.003 
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Unemployed in 1939 0.014  0.008  -0.006***   
 
(0.029)  (0.015)  (0.002)   
Observations 1,837 1,778  1,837 1,631 
(Pseudo-) R² 0.020  0.073  0.003  0.053 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee dummy for the linear probability models and 
marginal effects evaluated at the means of the covariates for the probit models. The sample 
includes West Germans and expellees that reported to be unemployed in 1950. In the probit 
models, the dependent variable does not vary within some of the categories of the independent 
variables. E.g. there is only a very small number of observations with university degree and none 
of them are unemployed in 1960 or 1971. We drop those observations to fit the model. Constant is 
not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.*** statistically significant at 
the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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4.2. Restitution of Previous or Comparable Occupations in Case of 
Degradation 
When analysing whether the law helped expellees find a job equivalent to their 
occupation prior to WWII, we compare expellees that reported that they were (i) 
not unemployed or working in an unskilled occupation in 1939 but (ii) worked in an 
unskilled occupation in 1950 (that is before the introduction of the law), with their 
local West German counterparts. We analyze whether expellees were more likely to 
work in a skilled job than their local West German counterparts after the 
introduction of the law, i.e. in 1960 and 1971. Again, the comparison group is 
highly selective since most local West Germans already found a job in 1950 which 
was equivalent to their occupation prior to WWII. If anything, it is thus most likely 
to find a positive effect of the law when comparing expellees to this selective 
group. If the law was successful in bringing expellees into their pre-war or 
equivalent occupations, we should find a negative, significant coefficient on the 
expellee dummy-variable. In other words, expellees should have a lower probability 
to work in an unskilled occupation compared to similar local West Germans. 
However, Table 5 shows that the coefficients are either very close to zero (Columns 
1 and 2) or even positive (Columns 3 and 4). Beyond, both coefficients are 
statistically not different from zero. Even though Figure 2 documents that the 
fractions of expellees working in unskilled jobs decline over time, this is likely 
driven by general economic development and cannot be attributed to the law. 
 
4.3. Promotion of Self-Employment and Entrepreneurship  
A further goal of the law was to promote entrepreneurship and self-employment 
among expellees. The main mechanisms were (i) to reduce credit constraints for 
expellees who had to leave all their belongings in their homelands when coming to 
West Germany and (ii) to compensate them for a missing local social network that 
facilitates access to resources and customers. The latter was done by offering better 
opportunities to rent state-owned property for business purposes and ensuring that 
businesses run by expellees were treated preferentially when public contracts were 
awarded. 
In agriculture, inheritance of the family farm is one of the key determinants 
of an individual’s decision to become self-employed. The displacement eliminated 
this possibility for the expellees. Consequently, it would not be meaningful to 
compare expellees to local West Germans who are potential candidates for 
inheritance of a family farm. We thus restrict local West Germans and expellees to 
(i) individuals who worked in the agricultural sector in 1939, but not as a family 
worker or self-employed farmers and (ii) individuals who were not self-employed 
farmers in 1950. These restrictions should ensure that we do not consider local 
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West Germans who inherited a family farm between 1950 and 1960. We then 
analyze the effect of the law on agricultural self-employment in 1960 and 1971 by 
comparing those groups. 
 
Table 5: Unskilled worker 
  
1960  1971 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
Expellee -0.001  -0.001  0.009  0.015 
 
(0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Age  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.021***  -0.026*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Female -0.180***  -0.189***  -0.196***  -0.214*** 
 
(0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Elementary School -0.062**  -0.066**  -0.032  -0.039 
 
(0.028)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.028) 
Secondary School -0.191***  -0.203***  -0.121***  -0.133*** 
 
(0.030)  (0.033)  (0.026)  (0.030) 
High School -0.431***  -0.444***  -0.351***  -0.570*** 
 
(0.096)  (0.110)  (0.051)  (0.168) 
Technical School -0.321***  -0.334***  -0.206***  -0.234*** 
 
(0.046)  (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.047) 
University -0.459*  -0.471  -0.141  -0.101 
 
(0.248)  (0.289)  (0.244)  (0.256) 
Property (1939) 0.012  0.013  -0.004  -0.006 
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Observations 8,439  8,439 
(Pseudo-) R² 0.062  0.047  0.199  0.182 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee dummy for the linear probability models and 
marginal effects evaluated at the means of the covariates for the probit models. The sample 
includes West Germans and expellees that reported not to be unemployed or working in an 
unskilled occupation in 1939 but worked in an unskilled occupation in 1950. Constant is not 
reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.*** statistically significant at the 
1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: Self-employed farmers 
  
1960  1971 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
Expellee -0.022***  -0.017***  -0.024***  -0.017*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Age  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female -0.032***  -0.020***  -0.037***  -0.023*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Elementary School 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.003 
 
(0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Secondary School -0.009  -0.005  -0.001  0.001 
 
(0.008)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
High School -0.023***    -0.024***   
 
(0.008)    (0.009)   
Technical School -0.001  0.001  0.019  0.007 
 
(0.016)  (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.006) 
University -0.035***    -0.038***   
 
(0.008)    (0.008)   
Property (1939) 0.022***  0.013***  0.025***  0.013*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Observations 6,730  6,691  6,730  6,691 
(Pseudo-) R² 0.027  0.152  0.033  0.169 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee dummy for the linear probability models and 
marginal effects evaluated at the means of the covariates for the probit models. The sample 
includes West Germans and expellees that reported to be unemployed in 1950. In the probit 
models, the dependent variable does not vary within some of the categories of the independent 
variables. E.g. there is only a very small number of observations with university degree and none 
of them is self-employed or entrepreneur in the agricultural sector in 1960 or 1971. We drop those 
observations to fit the model. Constant is not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% 
level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 documents that the law was not successful in promoting self-employment 
among expellees in the agricultural sector. Despite facilitated access to 
agricultural land, we find negative and significant coefficients on the expellee 
dummy in 1960 and 1971. In other words, compared to their West German 
counterparts who (i) had experience in working in agriculture, (ii) were not self-
employed in agriculture in 1950 and (iii) were not likely to inherit a family farm, 
expellees were 1.7 to 2.4 percentage points less likely to become self-employed 
farmers in 1960 and 1971. Apparently, the law could not promote self-
employment in the agricultural sector.  
We next turn to self-employment and entrepreneurship in non-agricultural 
sectors. Since local West Germans might still have had a supportive local social 
network after WWII, we introduce an additional comparison group composed of 
GDR refugees who were not covered by the law. Like the expellees, GDR 
refugees had to leave their belongings and their local social network behind. 
However, Table 7 reveals that GDR refugees were 0.9 to 1.1 percentage points 
less likely to be self-employed and entrepreneurs in 1939 as compared to the 
expellees (Columns 1 and 2). This lower entrepreneurial spirit in combination 
with their lack of assets and social networks qualifies them to be a suitable 
comparison group that, again, helps us to uncover even small effects of the law. In 
order to estimate the effect of the law on transition into entrepreneurship and self-
employment, we compare entrepreneurial status in 1960 and 1971, respectively, 
(i) between expellees and West Germans who were not self-employed or 
entrepreneur in 1950 and (ii) between expellees and GDR refugees who were both 
not covered by the law and not self-employed or entrepreneur in 1950. Table 8 
shows negative and significant coefficients on the transition into self-employment 
for expellees compared to both local West Germans and GDR refugees. That is, 
expellees were between 0.4 and 1.0 percentage points less likely to be self-
employed in 1960 and 1971 given that they have not already been self-employed 
in 1950.  
The comparison with local West Germans might be misleading, because it 
might be the case that the coefficients were even larger in absolute terms in 
absence of the Federal Expellee Law. However, the negative coefficients in the 
comparison of expellees and GDR refugees who (i) faced the same initial 
conditions in West Germany and (ii) seem to have a lower entrepreneurial spirit 
indicate that the promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship among 
expellees was not successfully advanced by the law.  
The law also aimed at reducing the risk of exit among self-employed 
expellees and entrepreneurs, for instance by transforming short-term loans into 
long-term contracts. 
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Table 7: Difference in the probability of being entrepreneur in the non-agricultural sector between the three groups 
Group 1939  1950  1960  1971 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 LPM Probit  LPM Probit  LPM Probit  LPM Probit 
Expellees to West Germans 0.002 0.001  -0.033*** -0.034***  -0.030*** -0.031***  -0.023*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Expellees to GDR refugees 0.011** 0.009**  -0.009* -0.007**  -0.014** -0.009***  -0.013*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.002) 
GDR refugees to West 
Germans -0.011** -0.010**  -0.025*** -0.021***  -0.018*** -0.014***  -0.015*** -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee or east dummy for the linear probability models and marginal effects evaluated at the 
means of the covariates for the probit models, respectively. All regressions control for female, age, education, and property ownership 
in 1939. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at 
the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 8: Entrepreneur foundations 
 
West Germans 
 
GDR refugees without expellee status 
  
1960  1971 
 
1960  1971 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
Expellee -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.009**  -0.005***  -0.010**  -0.005*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Age  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female -0.012***  -0.009***  -0.015***  -0.010***  -0.012***  -0.008***  -0.014***  -0.009*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Elementary School 0.003**  0.004**  0.001  0.002  0.005**  0.009*  0.004*  0.006 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Secondary School 0.012***  0.011***  0.012***  0.010***  0.012***  0.014***  0.013***  0.012** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
High School 0.020***  0.015***  0.026***  0.016***  0.020**  0.018***  0.029***  0.018*** 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Technical School 0.034***  0.019***  0.034***  0.018***  0.044***  0.025***  0.040***  0.020*** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
University 0.030***  0.019***  0.045***  0.023***  0.035***  0.024***  0.046***  0.022*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006) 
Property (1939) 0.005***  0.003***  0.006***  0.004***  0.004***  0.003***  0.005***  0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Self-employed 1939 0.071***  0.025***  0.034***  0.017***  0.068***  0.020***  0.025***  0.011*** 
 (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.002) 
Observations 158,797  158,789  24,112  24,112 
(Pseudo-) R² 0.016  0.084  0.017  0.097  0.024  0.119  0.019  0.116 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee dummy for the linear probability models and marginal effects evaluated at the means of the 
covariates for the probit models. The sample includes West Germans and Expellees, GDR Refugees, and Expellees respectively that were not 
self-employed in 1950. Constant is not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.*** statistically significant at the 1% 
level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9 shows the probability to be self-employed or entrepreneur in 1960 and 
1971, respectively given an individual reported to be self-employed or entrepreneur 
in 1950. The negative coefficients in Columns (1) to (4) show that expellees were 
substantially less likely to continue self-employed or entrepreneur in 1960 and 1971 
as compared to their West German counterparts. They were about 8 to 12 
percentage points more likely to exit self-employment entrepreneurship compared 
to local West Germans.  
Presumably expellees that became self-employed or entrepreneur right after 
their arrival in West Germany did so out of necessity and as an alternative to being 
unemployed. Over time, they either were not successful and had to close their 
businesses or they did find more profitable employment. Since the nature of self-
employment and entrepreneurship between West Germans and expellees who were 
self-employed in 1950 is likely to differ, the effect of the expellee law is difficult to 
assess by this comparison. We therefore make use of the GDR refugees that had the 
same starting conditions as expellees and compare them to expellees. If the law was 
successful in the support of self-employed or entrepreneurial expellees, we should 
find positive coefficients by comparing them to the group of refugees. However, we 
still find negative effects which are very close to zero and statistically not 
significant (cf. Columns 5 to 8). That is, even compared to individuals who became 
self-employed or entrepreneur in a very similar situation as expellees, we do not 
find positive effects of the law on the continuation of entrepreneurship among 
expellees. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the success of the 1953 Federal Expellee Law. It was 
designed to ameliorate the precarious situation of expellees upon their arrival in 
West Germany after WWII. The WWII shock was most severe for the group of 
expellees because they were forced to leave their homelands thus losing their 
possessions and their social ties. We allow for a general catch-up of expellees in a 
period of dramatic economic growth where unemployment among the local West 
German population was close to zero and compare the group of expellees to 
subgroups of local West Germans and GDR refugees who were arguably selective 
and possibly less likely to benefit from a general catch-up process during the 
economic boom in post-WWII Germany.  
But despite the combination of economic boom and support by the law 
(which may upward-bias our estimations), we find no indication of a distinct effect 
of the law on expellees’ situation. The possibility of expellees relocating to improve 
their economic conditions would just as well shift our estimates upwards. We 
therefore conclude that the improved economic situation of expellees can be 
attributed to the general economic boom in the aftermath of WWII and not to the 
provision of the Federal Expellee Law.    
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Table 9: Entrepreneur continuity 
 
West Germans 
 
GDR refugees without Expellee Status 
  
1960  1971  1960  1971 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
 
LPM  Probit  LPM  Probit 
Expellee -0.079***  -0.077***  -0.104***  -0.120***  -0.017  -0.016  -0.022  -0.025 
 
(0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.045)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.056) 
Age  -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.019***  -0.021***  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.018***  -0.022*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Female -0.121***  -0.114***  -0.148***  -0.169***  -0.117***  -0.112***  -0.172***  -0.213*** 
 
(0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.044) 
Elementary School -0.085***  -0.085**  -0.039  -0.038  -0.018  -0.024  -0.314***  -0.392*** 
 
(0.032)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.129)  (0.121)  (0.106)  (0.135) 
Secondary School -0.047  -0.048  0.032  0.042  0.137  0.124  -0.228**  -0.282** 
 
(0.032)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.128)  (0.121)  (0.107)  (0.135) 
High School -0.001  0.002  0.165***  0.186***  0.310**  0.334**  -0.094  -0.122 
 
(0.039)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.145)  (0.165)  (0.136)  (0.163) 
Technical School -0.022  -0.017  0.104***  0.118***  0.084  0.072  -0.231**  -0.287** 
 
(0.034)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.132)  (0.125)  (0.111)  (0.139) 
University 0.060*  0.087**  0.316***  0.366***  0.283**  0.349**  0.105  0.089 
 
(0.035)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.131)  (0.141)  (0.116)  (0.148) 
Property (1939) 0.032***  0.034***  0.038***  0.043***  0.056*  0.058*  0.130***  0.147*** 
 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.035) 
Self-employed 1939 0.084***  0.085***  0.031***  0.038***  0.073**  0.078**  0.020  0.026 
 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.037) 
Observations 11,172  11,172  966  966 
(Pseudo-) R² 0.066  0.0597  0.156  0.1234  0.092  0.0786  0.186  0.1562 
Notes: Table reports coefficients on an expellee dummy for the linear probability models and marginal effects evaluated at the means of the 
covariates for the probit models. The sample includes West Germans and expellees, GDR refugees, and Expellees respectively that were self-
employed in 1950. Constant is not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.*** statistically significant at the 1% level; 
** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A1: Occupational status of local West Germans and expellees before and after WWII 
 Expellees  Local West Germans 
Occupation  1939  1950  1960  1971  1939  1950  1960  1971 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Unemployed  0.27%  3.34%  0.17%  0.19%  0.27%  0.72%  0.08%  0.1% 
Unskilled worker  20.94%  25.27%  22.09%  14.73%  20.47%  15.96%  13.99%  9.29% 
Entrepreneur 
(agricultural) 
 5.08%  0.68%  0.72%  0.52%  3.60%  4.60%  4.09%  2.43% 
Entrepreneur (non-
agricultural) 
 4.97%  3.71%  3.91%  2.65%  4.94%  7.03%  6.85%  4.79% 
Civil servant   3.21%  1.98%  2.20%  1.18%  2.67%  2.34%  2.05%  0.99% 
Civil servant (upper- 
and upper-middle-
level) 
 
1.72%  1.35%  1.51% 
 
0.91% 
 
1.43%  1.38% 
 
1.37% 
 
0.75% 
Pensioner, other non-
employed 
 2.67%  9.71%  20.14%  7.95%  2.69%  5.73%  17.00%  8.09% 
Housewife  26.85%  34.12%  29.87%  5.31%  29.40%  34.31%  30.14%  4.44% 
Other   34.29%  19.84%  19.39%  66.56%  34.53%  27.93%  24.43%  69.12% 
Notes: Table shows the percentage shares of expellees and local West Germans by occupational status before and after WWII. The category 
“Other” include employees, craftsmen, and family workers. 
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